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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
LABOR LAW-BOYCOITS AND STRIKES-
PICKETING-The Picketing of an Independent 
Warehouse in Which a Primary Employer's Goods 
Are Stored-Steelworkers, Local 6991 
(Auburndale Freezer Corp.)* 
Cypress Gardens Citrus Products, Inc. (Cypress or primary em-
ployer) leased ten per cent of the cold-storage warehouse of Auburn-
dale Freezer Corporation (Auburndale) in Eloise, Florida, for the 
storage of its frozen orange-juice concentrate. Except for those 
employees who delivered concentrate to the warehouse by truck, 
no Cypress employees performed any work there; the warehouse was 
maintained by three Auburndale employees and thirty employees 
from Minute Maid Company. During contract negotiations between 
Cypress and the representative of its employees, Local 6991 of the 
United Steelworkers of America (union), an impasse was reached 
and the union went on strike. Subsequent to the calling of the 
strike, the union picketed the truck entrances to Auburndale's 
warehouse and the railroad spur track adjacent to it. Although the 
picket signs emphasized that the dispute was only with Cypress,1 at 
the time of the picketing no Cypress employees were making de-
liveries of concentrate, picking up goods of Cypress, or engaging in 
any other business at the warehouse. In response to the union's 
picketing, Auburndale and Minute Maid filed unfair labor practice 
complaints with the National Labor Relations Board (Board or 
NLRB);2 and the trial examiner found8 that the union's activity at 
the warehouse constituted secondary picketing in violation of sec-
tions 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).4 
• 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1503 Gune 30, 1969). 
1. The signs read: 
Employees of Cypress Gardens Products are ON STRIKE. We have no dispute 
with any other employer. United Steelworkers of America, Local 6991, AFL-CIO. 
Steelworkers, Local 6991 (Auburndale Freezer Corp.), 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 
L.R.R.M. 1503 (1969). 
2. In general, an unfair labor practice is one of those activities by either an em-
ployer or a union which are specifically prohibited by § 8 of the National Labor 
Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). See note 4 infra. 
3. United Steelworkers of America &: Auburndale Freezer Corp., Case No. 12-CC-
51!!-l, TXD-102-68 (1969) (Trial Examiner's Decision). 
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) (1964). These sections provide in part: 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any 
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, 
a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, 
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coer~, or restrain any 
[1439] 
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Moreover, the trial examiner found that even if the warehouse pre-
sented a common-situs situation, 5 the picketing did not take place 
at a time when the primary employer was engaged in normal busi-
ness at the situs, and therefore did not meet the criteria for permis-
sible common-situs picketing, which were set down by the Board in 
Sailor's Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.).6 The Board, 
however, disagreed with the trial examiner and, in a three-to-two 
decision, concluded that the Auburndale warehouse was a common 
situs and that the union's picketing was primary and therefore pro-
tected.7 Thus, the Board rejected the trial examiner's recommended 
cease-and-desist order and dismissed the complaint.8 The case is now 
on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.9 
Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA was passed to protect neutral 
employers from becoming involved in disputes between other em-
ployers and employees of such other employers and from being 
harmed by the activity of the striking employees.1° Congress sought 
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, w~ere in 
either case an object thereof is ••• 
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, 
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ... : Pro-
vided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make 
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary 
picketing. 
5. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 3, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. For discussion of the common-
situs doctrine, see text accompanying notes 20-51 infra. 
6. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). In that case the union picketed outside an entrance to a 
dockyard, owned by a secondary employer, where the primary employer's ship was tied 
up. These were the only premises on which picketing could take place effectively. The 
Board held that under such circumstances picketing is permitted so long as (1) the 
picketing is limited to times at which the situs of the dispute is located on the 
secondary employer's premises, (2) at the time of the picketing the primary employer 
is engaged in normal business at the situs, (3) the picketing is limited to places that 
are reasonably close to the location of the situs, and (4) the picket signs clearly disclose 
that the dispute is only with the primary employer. 92 N.L.R.B. at 549. 
7. The Board found that even if the pickets' appeal was to common carriers who 
might pick up Cypress' goods, such picketing was permissible under the doctrine of 
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964) [Carrier Corporation], in which the 
Supreme Court validated picketing which is aimed at railroad employees and which 
takes place on a spur track immediately adjacent to the primary employer's premises. 
8. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 7, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1505. 
9. Appeal docketed, No. 28522, 5th Cir., Sept. 29, 1969. 
10. As stated by Senator Taft, "This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a 
secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned 
in the disagreement between an employer and his employees .••• " 93 CoNG. REc. 
4198, in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Am: OF 1947, at 
1106 (1948). See also Local 761, Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961) [General 
Electric]; Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another 
Chapter, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, 133 (1959); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary 
Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1411 (1962): Tower, A Perspective on Secondary 
Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 740 (1951). 
June 1970] Recent Developments 1441 
to attain these objectives by classifying secondary activity by unions 
as an unfair labor practice. Secondary activity is activity which is di-
rected against persons other than the employer of the employees 
directly involved in the dispute, and which is intended to persuade 
those persons to cease doing business with the primary employer.11 
It is clear from the proviso to sections 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B),12 however, 
that Congress did not intend to curtail or interfere with activity 
directed at the employer of the employees directly involved in the 
dispute-"primary activity"-even if there are incidental effects 
on others.13 Nevertheless, the distinction between primary and 
secondary activity, or more particularly between primary and sec-
ondary picketing, is not always clear.14 
When a group of employees strike against their own employer 
-the primary employer-their purpose usually is to disrupt his 
operations in the hope that economic pressure will persuade or 
coerce him to meet their demands. They may picket the primary 
employer's premises in order to publicize the strike or to try to 
persuade fellow employees to join it; and even if the picketing in-
duces third persons not to deal with the primary, the employees' 
activity constitutes protected primary picketing.15 If the goal of the 
striking employees is in fact to publicize the strike and to persuade 
their co-workers, they will naturally picket where they will reach 
the public or those employees. If, however, the striking employees 
should decide that such tactics do not sufficiently influence their 
employer, they might elect to picket the premises of a secondary 
employer who deals with the primary employer, in an attempt to 
persuade the secondary's employees to refuse to handle the primary's 
product. If those secondary employees cooperate with the striking 
union, the secondary employer may be compelled either to pres-
sure the primary into accepting the union's demands or to cease 
II. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 624 (1967). 
12. See note 4 supra. 
13. 386 U.S. at 627. The report of the conference committee for the Landrum-
Griffin amendments emphasized that the purpose of the proviso was "to make it clear 
that the changes in 8(b)(4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law per-
mitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1147, 
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959), in l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, at 942. 
14. Justice Frankfurter referred to the line between primary and secondary 
activity as "more nice than obvious." Local 761, Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 
667, 674 (1961). 
15. Local 761, Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961). See also NLRB v. 
International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951); NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters, 
284 F.2d 887, 889 (2d Cir. 1960). St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?, 
in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAw DEVELOPMENTS-PROCEEDINGS OF 
ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAw 5, 30-31 (1965), discusses the objectives of 
an "ordinary strike." 
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doing business with the primary. This prototype of the secondary 
boycott is prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B),16 and it demonstrates 
that the usual purpose and effect of picketing on secondary premises 
is to disturb the operations of a party not directly involved in the 
dispute beforehand. 
The essence of the distinction between primary and secondary 
picketing is normally whether the business operations of the primary 
employer take place at the site picketed. This issue may be compli-
cated, however, by the possibility that elements of both primary and 
secondary operations may be present at one location. The Auburn-
dale case involves such a situation, because the primary employer's 
product is located on the picketed premises, which are owned by a 
secondary employer. 
The developing case law has recognized that sometimes when 
the primary employer is engaged in some business on the premises 
of a secondary, picketing on those secondary premises is permissible 
despite the general ban in section 8(b)(4) against secondary picket-
ing. Only two of these exceptions, the common-situs doctrine17 and 
the related-work doctrine,18 are reasonably applicable to the circum-
stances presented in Auburndale.19 In fact, the common-situs doc-
16. See note 4 supra. See also Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Following the 
Struck Product, 52 VA. L. REv. 189, 204-06 (1966). 
17. The common-situs doctrine is usually applied to picketing on neutral or sec-
ondary premises. However, a common-situs situation can arise on primary premises. 
For example, in R'etail Clerks, Local 1017 v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957) 
[Crystal Palace Market], the primary employer owned a large common market with 
shops inside, some of which he operated and others of which were operated by inde-
pendent contractors. The union picketed outside the entire market. The court held 
that this activity constituted illegal picketing of a common situs, because of the 
union's failure to minimize the effect on the secondaries. 
18. The related-work doctrine is discussed at notes 52-73 infra and accompanying 
text. 
19. Two of the exceptions which are not pertinent to the Auburndale case com• 
prise variations of the "ally doctrine." First, when there exist common ownership and 
control of the businesses of the primary and secondary employers, the secondary is 
considered to be merely an extension of the primary, so that picketing of the sec-
ondary constitutes protected primary picketing. See, e.g., Miami Newspaper Press-
man's Local No. 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Second, when the sec-
ondary employer "knowingly does work which would otherwise be done by the striking 
employees or the primary employer," that is, when the secondary performs struck 
work, picketing of that secondary employer is considered to be primary picketing. 
NLRB v. Local 459, Radio &: Mach. Workers, 228 F.2d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1955) 
[Royal Typewriter]. For a concise summary of the ally doctrine, see Engel, supra 
note 16, at 204-06. Neither variation of the ally doctrine exists in the principal case. 
In Auburndale there was no evidence of common ownership and control of the 
primary and secondary employers, and the Board pointed out that the struck-work 
theory has been rejected several times in the setting of warehouse picketing. 177 
N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 3-4, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. See Local 868, Teamsters (Mercer Storage 
Co.), 156 N.L.R.B. 67 (1965). Warehouse Union Local 6 (Hershey Chocolate Corp.), 
153 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1965); Regional Council No. 3, Intl. Woodworkers (Priest Logging, 
Inc.), 137 NL.R.B. 352 (1962) affd., 319 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1963). 
A third type of secondary picketing which has been permitted is picketing that is 
addressed only to consumers of a retailer and that urges them merely to refuse to buy 
the particular product manufactured by the primary. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable 
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trine was expressly relied on by the Board in Auburndale. The 
term "situs" has generally been defined as "the place of perform-
ance of the work involved in the basic dispute."20 Thus, in the 
classic primary-picketing situation in which the union pickets the 
primary employer's factory, that factory is the situs of the dispute. 
A common situs is, therefore, a location at which both the primary 
and the secondary employers are performing work. Indeed, in Local 
761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB (General Electric),21 the Supreme 
Court defined the common-situs situation as one in which "two 
employers [are] performing separate tasks on common premises."22 
More recently, the Court reaffirmed this definition when it referred 
to a common situs as "a place . . . where both the struck employer 
and 'secondary' or 'neutral' employers are carrying on business 
activities."23 Both of these Supreme Court formulations of the com-
mon-situs concept imply positive action on the part of the employers 
or their agents at the place at which the picketing occurs. 
As a test of whether a common-situs situation exists, the state-
ment in General Electric has the virtue of being easy to apply. If 
the primary employer has one or more employees working on the 
premises of another eµiployer, a common situs is established. The 
union may then proceed to demonstrate its compliance with the 
limitations placed on common-situs picketing in Moore Dry Dock.24 
Moreover, it is appropriate that any definition in the area of labor 
relations be articulated in terms of work performed.25 The policy 
of section 8(b)(4) is twofold: to protect neutral parties from becom-
Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) [Tree Fruits]. In that case, the Supreme Court 
upheld picketing which was aimed solely at a particular type of apple being sold at the 
picketed supermarket. Since the principal case involves neither retail consumers nor 
union appeals to customers, this doctrine is not applicable. 
20. Johns, Picketing and Secondary Boycotts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LAB. 
L.J. 257, 266 (1951). In .Moore Dry Dock the Board stated that because the ship "was 
the place of employment of the seamen, it was the situs of the dispute." 92 N L.R.B. 
at 549. See also Engel, supra note 16, at 201, in which the "common site" cases are 
described as those "where employees of the primary employer were engaged in work 
activity on the premises of a secondary employer," and Lesnick, supra note IO, at 
1423, which states that "the 'situs of the dispute' is located wherever any primary 
employees are working." 
21. 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
22. 366 U.S. at 676-77, 679. 
23. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 388-89 
(1969). 
24. 92 N.L.R.B. 547,549. See note 6 supra. 
25. One interesting problem that might arise is whether the presence on the prem-
ises of a secondary employer of a computer or vending machine is a common situs. 
One would assume that it is not; but literally, in these situations, the primary is 
performing tasks just as much as when he stations a bookkeeper or sales clerk on the 
premises. Such an approach, however, ignores the obvious fact that picketing em-
ployees want to appeal to people rather than to machines; consequently the absence or 
presence of machines should not be relevant. In any event, the primary employer in 
Auburndale did not leave on secondary premises any machines that perform tasks; 
rather it left only inanimate orange juice. 
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ing embroiled in labor disputes which do not concern them and, at 
the same time, to preserve the pickets' right to appeal directly to 
primary employees or to the public. I£ picketing occurs at a situs, 
such as a warehouse, at which the primary employer is not engaged 
in activity and at which an appeal to the public is not the objec-
tive, no primary employees will be present and thus none will be 
exposed to the picketing. Hence, such picketing must be suspect as 
secondary, rather than primary, picketing. Significantly, the United 
States courts of appeals have long defined common situs in terms of 
work performed by the primary employer.26 
In Auburndale, the Board decided that the Auburndale ware-
house was a common situs despite the absence of primary employees. 
It reached this conclusion by applying a flexible, but vague, test: 
In determining whether or not the Auburndale warehouse is a 
common situs the question is whether or not there is sufficient 
"presence of the primary" at the secondary site, or, to put the 
matter another way, whether the evidence is sufficient to establish 
" ... that direct and immediate relationship between the picketing 
and the object picketed necessary to a finding of purely primary 
picketing."27 
Applying this standard, the Board determined that "the Auburn-
dale warehouse constituted a common situs because of the continu-
ous 'presence' of the Cypress operation at that location."28 The 
business operation of Cypress was apparently present at the ware-
house because Cypress trucks regularly delivered concentrate to the 
warehouse,29 because cold storage "constitutes an integral part of 
the Cypress production process,"30 and because Cypress maintained 
control over the concentrate insofar as it could determine who 
could pick up the concentrate.31 
If the only problem with the Board's "sufficient presence" test 
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1955) [Otis Massey 
Co.] ("where both primary and neutral employers occupy a common work site'); NLRB 
v. International Hod Carriers, 285 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1960) ("where a neutral em-
ployer is engaged, along with a primary employer, in different activities on the same 
premises'); Markwell &: Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1967) ("where 
employees of the primary and of the secondary employers work side by side'). 
27. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 4, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504, quoting from Teamsters, 
Local 807 (Sterling Beverages, Inc.), 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950) (emphasis added). 
28. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 6, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1505. 
29. Relying on Local 3, Elec. Workers (New Power Wire &: Elec. Corp.), 144 
N.L.R.B. 1089 (1963), afjd., 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1965), the Board concluded that the 
absence of Cypress employees from the warehouse during the actual time of the 
picketing was of no consequence because their absence was due to the strike. See text 
accompanying notes 56-59 infra. 
30. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. 
31. This is generally the situation when a warehouseman issues negotiable ware-
house receipts to a person leaving goods with him. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§§ 7-104(l)(a), 7-403. 
June 1970] Recent Developments 1445 
were its vagueness, it would not necessarily be unworkable. The 
jargon of the law is full of terms such as "reasonable," "good faith," 
and "unconscionable," which are just as inherently vague, yet 
which are applied by courts every day. But those terms have ac-
quired viability because they have a long case-law development 
and because there are no more precise terms which can adequately 
convey their particular meanings. The Board, however, was unable 
to cite another case in which secondary premises had been held to 
be a common situs simply because there was "sufficient presence of 
the primary." Moreover, it could have applied the General Electric 
test which the Supreme Court had reaffirmed only three months 
earlier.82 Although the Board in Auburndale twice cited General 
Electric,88 it ignored both the reasons behind the common-situs 
doctrine and the Court's definition of a common situs. Had the 
NLRB followed the traditional common-situs test, it would have 
framed the essential issue of the case in terms of whether Cypress 
was performing any tasks at the warehouse. That question is prop-
erly answered in the negative. 
An employer usually operates through his employees, yet Cypress 
employees never performed any tasks on the premises of the ware-
house other than driving trucks up to the loading dock for Minute 
Maid employees to unload. A Cypress truck may be considered a 
roving or ambulatory situs, and it is true that Moore Dry Dock also 
involved such a movable situs. In that case the union picketed out-
side an entrance to a secondary employer's dockyard, in which the 
primary employer's ship (the roving situs) was located. The Board 
held that under such circumstances picketing can be permitted only 
at times when the roving situs is actually located on the secondary's 
premises.34 But in Auburndale, since no Cypress truck even ap-
proached the warehouse during the picketing, no common situs can 
be said to have existed at that time under the roving-situs doctrine. 
The Board apparently recognized that the roving-situs concept 
would not support a finding that there was a common situs in 
Auburndale. Consequently, the Board's conclusion that the ware-
house itself was the common situs of the dispute by virtue of the 
primary employer's continuing "presence" was based primarily on 
the combination of two factors: the storage of concentrate in the 
warehouse and the regular deliveries of concentrate by primary 
employees in the period preceding the strike.35 It is obvious, how-
ever, that the mere presence of the primary's product on secondary 
ll2. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., ll94 U.S. 369 (1969), 
was decided March 25, 1969, while Auburndale was decided June 30, 1969. 
33. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 4, 6, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504-05. 
34. 92 N.L.R.B. at 549. See note 6 supra. 
35. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. 
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premises does not satisfy the traditional General Electric require-
ment that the primary employer perform tasks on secondary prem-
ises in order for those premises to be classified as a common situs. 
Picket signs appeal to people, not to orange juice; in this case the 
signs did not appeal to primary employees because none were pres-
ent, or were even likely to be present, during the picketing. Further-
more, it is difficult to understand how regular visits by a roving situs 
to a particular location can render that location itself a common 
situs, even when it harbors the primary's product. The Board's opin-
ion pointed out that the truck drivers never actually handled the 
concentrate at the warehouse, and in fact did nothing outside of 
their cabs while at the warehouse other than sign receipts. 36 The 
drivers' work took place solely on trucks, each of which is a roving 
situs; and under Moore Dry Dock, picketing addressed to such 
workers is permissible only when the roving situs is present. There-
fore, the Board has combined two factors which individually would 
not satisfy the accepted General Electric performance-of-tasks test. 
One might expect some explanation in the Board's opinion of why 
such a combination sliould satisfy this test, especially in view of the 
expansion of the common-situs doctrine that results from the Board's 
conclusion that the warehouse is a common situs. Yet no such ex-
planation appears. 
A consideration of the policies involved supports the conclusion 
that this expansion of the common-situs doctrine is not justified. 
The objective of both the common-situs doctrine and the proviso to 
sections 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) is to protect and enhance the effectiveness 
of primary activity, even if there are incidental effects on neutral 
employees and their employers.37 In order to accomplish that goal, 
the common-situs doctrine permits "the union to follow the em-
ployees of the primary to make its employee-directed picketing 
activity most effective."38 Effects on secondary employees working at 
the common situs are tolerated only to the extent that such impact 
is merely incidental to the legitimate primary objective of appealing 
to primary employees.39 
The Auburndale decision is unnecessary to the accomplishment 
of that objective, however, because it permits picketing of secondary 
premises without regard to the presence or absence of primary em-
ployees. At the same time, the Board's holding creates a substantial 
36. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. 
37. With respect to the proviso to §§ 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B), see National Woodwork 
Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967); NLRB v. International Rice Milling 
Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951). With respect to the common-situs doctrine, see Engel, 
supra note 16, at 207. 
38. See International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951); NLRB v. 
General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1955) [Otis Massey Co.]. 
39. Engel, supra note 16, at 207. 
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danger that relatively minor, isolated labor disputes may be allowed 
to expand into substantial tie-ups of commerce.4° For example, in 
Auburndale, a strike against Cypress was broadened to affect Au-
burndale, Minute Maid, Cypress' customers, and any carriers or 
boxcars that approached Aubumdale's warehouse. 
At least one court has expressly rejected the Auburndale Board's 
common-situs theory in a factual setting similar to that in Auburn-
dale. In McLeod v. United Auto Workers, Local 365,41 the UAW 
was involved in a dispute with Intertype. The UAW picketed the 
premises of Intertype and also picketed a warehouse, owned by 
Eagle, in which Intertype stored nine machines destined for ship-
ment to purchasers. In a brief paragraph, the federal district court 
concluded: 
[T]here is no sharing of a common situs by Intertype and Eagle. 
Intertype has a permanent place of business which is being effec-
tively picketed and one of the objectives of the picketing against 
Eagle is pressure upon the secondary employer. Under the circum-
stances the situs of the nine (9) finished machines crated and stored 
for shipment in a neutral warehouse cannot be considered as a 
partial situs of this labor dispute.42 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
that decision without specifically discussing the common-situs issue.43 
J..1.cLeod cannot be considered conclusive of the issue, because it 
represents an expression by only one set of lower federal courts and 
because the discussion of the common-situs problem by the district 
court was extremely brief. Yet the decision appears to reflect a sound 
approach to factual situations such as those presented in McLeod 
and Auburndale. 
But even if the Board were correct in holding that the warehouse 
was a common situs in Auburndale, its subsequent conclusion that 
the picketing complied with the llfoore Dry Dock standards cannot 
be sustained. As previously discussed,44 that case dealt with a par-
ticular species of the common situs, a roving situs. However, the 
40. In Local 1976, Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) [Sand Door], 
the Supreme Court stated that § 8(b)(4) 
aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved 
by prohibiting ••• the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned 
with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement of their employees to 
engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods. 
For a general discussion of policy arguments against secondary boycotts, see Tower, 
A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 I.An. L.J. 727, 740 (1951). 
41. 200 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). 
42. 200 F. Supp. at 781. 
43. 299 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1962). As recognized in the Board's decision in Auburn-
dale, several other cases have, under similar circumstances, found violations of § 8(b)(4) 
without considering the common-situs question. See note 19 supra. 
44. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
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Supreme Court's opinion in General Electric indicates that the 
Moore Dry Dock criteria have been generally applied to all forms 
of common-situs picketing.45 In Auburndale, the Board was con-
cerned only with the requirement that at the time of picketing the 
primary employer be engaged in normal business at the situs.46 The 
Board, in determining that this requirement was met even though 
Cypress had no employees working at the warehouse, relied on New 
Power Wire and Electric Corporation,47 in which the Board had 
held that the absence of primary employees from a common situs is 
not relevant if attributable to the employees' participation in a 
strike. That case, however, involved construction sites at which 
primary employees, before the strike, regularly installed electrical 
wiring. Moreover, the primary employees spent all their time at the 
building sites and would never have seen pickets at the primary 
employer's premises. In Auburndale, on the other hand, the only 
primary employees who ever came to the warehouse were truck 
drivers who did not perform any services after the trucks were 
parked. It is clear that, since "the whole Cypress plant was on 
strike,"48 and since "during the picketing ... no Cypress trucks came 
to Auburndale,"49 the truck drivers were effectively contacted at the 
home factory. In any event, each Cypress truck would be a roving 
situs and, as noted earlier,50 any picketing would have to comply 
with the aforementioned Moore Dry Dock requirement that the 
roving situs be present when premises are picketed.51 
Despite these flaws in the Auburndale rationale, the Board's con-
clusion in that case that the picketing constituted protected primary 
activity was subsequently confirmed by a federal district court on a 
different legal theory. In Samofj v. Oil, Chemical, and Atomic 
Workers, Local 8-73252 the products of the primary employer, Avin-
sun Corporation (Avinsun), occupied about eighty-five per cent of 
the warehouse space of Industrial Warehousing Corporation (Indus-
trial), an independent corporation. A dispute over contract negotia-
tions developed between Avinsun and its employees, and the em-
ployees began picketing the Industrial warehouse. Industrial sought 
to have these activities temporarily enjoined pending the NLRB's 
45. The Court quoted with approval the Board's statement in Retail Clerks, Local 
1017 (Crystal Palace Market), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 859 (1956): "We believe ••• that the 
[Moore Dry Dock] principles should apply to all common situs picketing •••• " 366 
U.S. at 678-79. 
46. 92 N.L.R.B. at 549. See note 6 supra. 
47. Local 3, Elec. Workers, 144 NL.R.B. 1089 (1963), afjd., 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 
1965). 
48. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 6, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1505. 
49. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 3, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1504. 
50. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
51. See note 6 supra and text accompanying note 34 supra. 
52. 307 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1969). 
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final adjudication of the issue. The United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware refused to grant the injunction on the 
ground that the Auburndale decision was directly applicable and 
that therefore there did "not appear to be a reasonable probability 
that the petitioner will be entitled to final relief before the Board."53 
In applying the Auburndale decision, the district court empha-
sized the Board's statement that the storage of the concentrate 
at the warehouse constituted "an integral part of the Cypress pro-
duction process."1H Accordingly, the court concluded that the "re-
lated-work" doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court in General 
Electric and United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB (Carrier 
Corporation),55 was applicable to cases involving the storage of the 
primary's goods on secondary premises. The related-work doctrine 
provides that picketing directed at employees other than those of 
the struck employer, but who are "furnishing day-to-day service 
essential to the [primary] plant's regular operations," constitutes pro-
tected primary activity.56 The Supreme Court felt that this rule was 
necessary in order to permit striking unions to implement "the 
traditional goal of primary pressures" aimed at halting the opera-
tions of the primary employer by appealing to "all those approach-
ing the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise con-
tributing" to those operations.57 
There are two problems with applying the related-work doctrine 
to either Auburndale or Samo ff. First, it is not clear that storing 
goods is related work within the meaning of that doctrine. Carrier 
Corporation emphasized that related work consists of "day-to-day 
services essential to the [primary] plant's regular operations."58 Cer-
tainly, it is difficult to understand how warehousing is essential to 
plant operations, but it is also unclear how strictly this test should 
be confined to the plant setting. In the sense that the term "opera-
tions" connotes activity which contributes to production, ware-
housing appears not to constitute related work. Moreover, since 
General Electric and Carrier Corporation considered only deliveries 
to, and maintenance performed at, the primary's plant by secondary 
employees, it is unlikely that those cases envisioned warehousing of 
the primary's product at a remote secondary site as being within the 
53. 307 F. Supp. at 437. Two factual distinctions between the two cases make Sarnoff 
a stronger case for the union than is Auburndale. First, Industrial's warehouse was filled 
to 85% capacity with Avinsun goods, as compared to the 10% used by Cypress. Second, 
and of greater significance, Avinsun employees regularly inspected its stored product 
at the warehouse. Thus, it can be argued that in Sarnoff the primary performed tasks at 
the picketed premises. 
54. 177 NL.R.B. No. 108, at 5, 71 L.R.RM. at 1504. 
55. 376 U.S. 492 (1964). 
56. 376 U.S. at 499. 
57. 376 U.S. at 499. 
58. 1176 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added). 
1450 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68 
scope of related work. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the 
vague concept of related work is not, by itself, very helpful in de-
termining whether or not warehousing activities fall within that 
category. Consequently, it becomes necessary to rely on other factors 
in deciding whether related work should encompass warehousing 
activities so as to permit direct appeals to secondary warehouse em-
ployees in the course of a labor dispute with a primary employer 
who is storing goods in the warehouse. 
The most significant factor is the location of the picketing. Go It 
should be recognized that the related-work doctrine was developed 
in, and has generally been confined to, cases involving collective 
activity at the premises of the primary employer.60 As early as 1949, 
the Board rejected an argument that a boycott carried out against 
a secondary employer who performed related work on secondary 
premises was protected primary activity. In Metal Polishers Local 
171 (Climax Machinery Company)61 a primary employer with lim-
ited productive capacity found it necessary to have a secondary do 
the metal-plating, work which it normally performed itself. Even 
though that work was integral to the primary employer's production 
operations, the Board held that the union violated former section 
8(b)(4)(A)-now sections 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B)-by inducing the secon-
dary employees to cease performing the contracted work.62 
This approach was followed by the Board in Office and Profes-
sional Employees, Local 3 (American President Lines),63 decided 
after General Electric and Carrier Corporation. In that case a dis-
pute arose between Paredes, a customhouse broker, and his em-
ployees. One of Paredes' employees walked onto a pier owned by 
59. 376 U.S. at 499. 
60. General Electric involved the picketing of a separate gate which was on the 
primary's premises, although it was used only by employees of an independent con-
tractor (366 U.S. at 668-69); and Carrier Corporation dealt with the picketing of a 
spur track which was immediately adjacent to the primary employer's premises (!176 
U.S. at 494). See also Building & Constr. Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell & 
Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967) (picketing on 
construction premises owned by neither the primary nor the secondary, but on which 
employees of each were regularly working; United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Phelps 
Dodge Ref. Co.), 126 N.L.R.B. 1367, enforced, 289 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961); United 
Elec. Workers Local 813 (Ryan Constr. Co.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949). 
61. 86 N.L.R.B. 1243 (1949). 
62. Professor Lesnick finds this result to be compelling: 
When no primary employees are present at the secondary site, the Act plainly 
condemns inducement of secondary employees to refuse to work on materials 
coming there from the primary, even though the inducement be only "partial," 
that is, limited to those materials. 
Lesnick, supra note IO, at 1414. While that writer has suggested that a secondary 
boycott should be considered legitimate so long as the union does not intend "to 
subject the secondary to pressure different in kind from that generated against him 
by a primary strike," (id. at 1412), he has stated as a caveat that "only the effect of 
loss of the primary's employees may be considered" (id. at 1414). 
63. 156 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1966). 
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American President Lines (APL) and picketed a shipment of wine 
which the primary employer was processing through customs for an 
importer.64 Noting that the employee "picketed at the terminal not 
only at times when Paredes' employees were not present, but also 
in a circumstance where there was no indication that Paredes' nor-
mal business would require the presence of an employee at that loca-
tion,"60 both the trial examiner and the Board held that the pier was 
not a common situs and that the picketing was therefore illegal. Al-
though the work of the APL employees in unloading the wine and 
removing it from the pier was essential to the broker's normal 
business of expediting the fl.ow of imported goods through customs, 
the Board did not apply the related-work doctrine in this case. Thus, 
despite the fact that the related-work doctrine may not have been 
raised in argument, American President Lines does reflect the 
Board's strong policy of not permitting picketing on secondary prem-
ises when there are no primary employees working or likely to be 
working at the site.66 
In Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans 
(Markwell and Hartz),61 the Board explicitly held that the related-
work doctrine should not be extended to protect picketing on sec-
ondary premises. In that case, the primary employer, a general con-
tractor on a construction site owned by a third party, set up reserved 
gates for the exclusive use of employees of neutral subcontractors, in 
order to insulate them from the effects of its dispute with the Build-
ing Trades Council. The Council nevertheless picketed those sepa-
rate gates. In holding that this activity violated section 8(b)(4), the 
Board emphasized that 
the mere fact that picketing of a neutral gate at premises of a struck 
employer, may in proper circumstances be lawful primary action, does 
not require a like finding when a labor organization applies direct 
pressure upon secondary employers engaged on a common situs .... 
mhe Court's decisions in General Electric and Carrier Corp., merely 
64. The services of a customhouse broker involve the signing of receipts, the pay-
ing of fees, and so on, and not the actual physical handling of the goods. 
65. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1348. 
66. The statement in Seafarer's Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1959) 
[Salt Dome Prod.], that "the presence or absence of employees of the primary 
employer on the premises is not a critical factor in the legality of a picket line" does 
not represent an aberration from this policy. In that case the employer had tempo-
rarily removed nonstriking employees from their jobs, for the purpose of converting 
a lawful picket line into an unlawful one. Climax Machinery, American President 
Lines, and the warehouse cases are thus distinguishable on their facts, since in those 
cases no primary employees had ever worked on the situs. Indeed, in Local 519, 
Journeymen v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969), a case decided by the same 
court that decided Salt Dome, with one of the same judges sitting, the court empha-
sized that Salt Dome should be construed in light of its facts. See also note 47 supra 
and accompanying text. 
67. 155 NL.R.B. 319 (1965). 
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represent an implementation of the concomitant policy that lenient 
treatment be given to strike action taking place at the separate 
premises of a struck employer.68 
If the Board is unwilling to apply the related-work doctrine to a 
common situs, the argument is even more compelling for it not to 
invoke that doctrine in a case involving picketing at a remote 
secondary situs. Thus, the Delaware federal district court's attempt 
to justify the Auburndale decision on the related-work theory does 
not appear to be sound. 
There are strong policy reasons which militate against Sarnoff's 
extension of the r~lated-work doctrine to warehouse situations. 
When related work is performed on primary premises, there is little 
danger that either the primary or secondary employer will be sub-
jected to undue picketing or adverse publicity. Since the primary's 
employees are already on strike and presumably picketing his prem-
ises, the addition of pickets directed solely to secondary employees, 
even at "reserved gates," does not create measurable additional 
burdens on the primary employer. Moreover, since it is the primary 
premises that are being picketed, the secondary employer is affected 
only to the extent that the picketing causes his employees who are 
working at the premises of the primary to refuse to work. Although 
this effect could be substantial if a large proportion of the secon-
dary's employees were employed on the primary premises and could 
not be assigned elsewhere during the dispute, such a situation does 
not occur frequently, particularly in cases in which the secondary 
employees make deliveries at a separate gate. In the absence of com-
plex circumstances, then, the effects on the secondary employer of 
allowing direct appeals to his employees who are performing at the 
primary's premises work related to the ordinary operations of the 
68. 155 N.L.R.B. at 325. The Board's order was enforced by the Fifth Circuit in 
Markwell&: Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967). While Judge Connally's 
opinion announcing the court's judgment in that case appears to state that the related-
work doctrine can be applied to a common situs (387 F.2d at 82), that case does not 
support a further extension to purely neutral premises. Indeed, the other two judges 
who heard the case rejected that argument. Judge Rives, concurring, stated: 
When the work done by the secondary employees is related to the normal opera-
tions of the primary employer there remains a distinction between picketing at a 
common situs where two or more employers are performing separate tasks on 
common premises. It seems to me that the opinion in General Electric clearly 
recognizes that distinction. 
387 F.2d at 84. Although Judge Wisdom, dissenting, would have applied the related-
work doctrine to a common situs because he felt that General Electric was itself a 
common-situs case (387 F .2d at 89), he did assert that 
[t]he line between primary and secondary activity is relatively easy to draw where 
the primary and secondary employers have separate work-sites • • • activity ex-
tending beyond the premises of the primary employer to those of another em-
ployer, and designed to disrupt the operations of the latter employer, is secondary 
and prohibited. 
387 F.2d at 86. 
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primary may reasonably be said to be outweighed by the need for 
effective primary activity by the union during a labor dispute.69 
The warehousing situation, however, is significantly different. A 
warehouse is often located at a considerable distance from the pri-
mary employer's premises.70 While distance alone may not be the 
crucial test, the combination of the facts that the warehouse is sepa-
rate from the primary's premises and that it is generally the location 
of the goods of a number of primary employers suggests that the 
related-work doctrine should not be extended to permit picketing 
at the warehouse when that picketing is directed at secondary em-
ployees. Since the warehouse is a separate facility, the striking union 
must picket the premises of the secondary employer in order to 
reach the employees of the warehouse. In some instances, the picket-
ing of a warehouse by the employees of an employer who is storing 
goods in it may not differ in kind or effect from picketing directed 
at secondary employees on primary premises. But in the warehouse 
situation, the impact on the secondary's general operations differs in 
an important respect; and that difference can best be explained 
through illustration. Carrier Corporation holds that when one of 
the plants to which a common carrier regularly delivers has a labor 
dispute, striking plant employees may appeal to truck drivers who 
are employed by that neutral carrier and who approach a gate 
reserved for them. While this tactic prevents the carrier from carry-
ing on business with that particular plant, the carrier's business 
relations with everyone else are not affected. Furthermore, it is a 
matter of indifference to him whether drivers employed by other 
carriers refuse to cross the picket line. Even if there is never a time 
when at least one of the plants with which he does business is not 
being picketed, the carrier can insulate himself from such activity by 
merely avoiding that plant. On the other hand, when one of the 
employers who stores goods at a warehouse experiences a strike, the 
warehouse owner's entire operation is, under the Auburndale and 
Sarnoff holdings, subject to disruption, because the picketing occurs 
on his premises. Everyone who approaches the warehouse-which 
69. In support of the use of a balancing test to determine whether picketing is 
permissible secondary activity, see Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L.R.B. at 549 ("the 
problem is one of balancing the right of a union to picket at the site of its dispute as 
against the right of a secondary employer to be free from picketing in a controversy 
in which it is not directly involved'); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 
675, 692 (1951) ("the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor 
organizatoins to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor dis• 
putes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in contra• 
versies not their own'), quoted with approval in National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. 
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626 (1967). 
70. The Auburndale warehouse was located five to six miles from the Cypress plant 
(Trial Examiner's Decision, supra note 3, at 3), and the Industrial warehouse was nine 
miles from the Avinsun plant (307 F. Supp. at 435). 
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probably includes everyone who deals with the warehouseman-sees 
the pickets. Thus, the neutral owner is unable to separate the disrup-
tion caused by a labor dispute between one of his customer's and 
that customer's employees from the rest of his business operations. 
Moreover, the warehouse owner might be subjected to adverse pub-
licity because of his frequent involvement in labor disputes; and he 
is exposed to the possibility that his operations would be disrupted 
by work stoppages or carrier refusals to cross picket lines.71 Again, 
it must be recognized that these effects could be multiplied by the 
picketing of his premises by various unions at different times. These 
risks appear to he considerably more severe than those to which a 
secondary employer is exposed when his employees perform related 
work at the primary's plant; and they suggest that the related-work 
doctrine should not, without substantial justification, be extended to 
the situation involving a separate warehouse. 
Permitting picketing addressed to secondary employees who are 
performing related work at or near the primary's plant can he justi-
fied if it enables a union to carry out its legitimate strike objective of 
completely halting the primary employer's normal operations.72 For 
example, if regular deliveries of supplies are made by a common 
carrier, the plant may be able to continue partial production 
through the use of supervisory employees and nonstriking em-
ployees, thus frustrating the effectiveness of the primary strike. But 
such a policy is not involved in picketing that is addressed to sec-
ondary employees at a remote warehouse mvned by a secondary em-
ployer. Whether the warehouse is picketed or not, the primary's 
plant operations can be completely shut down by an effective boy-
cott at the primary site;73 and a boycott of the warehouse would not 
help to achieve a shutdown of the primary's plant. Therefore, since 
an extension of the related-work doctrine to a distant, secondary 
warehouse does not appear to contribute to the objectives which 
justify picketing at a separate gate on primary premises, and since 
71. It might be argued that the consequences of picketing the warehouse are rela-
tively limited liecause the scope of the pickets' appeal to the warehouse employees 
must be confined to asking them not to handle the goods of the particular employer 
involved in the dispute. But even if the permissible scope of the picketing is so 
restricted, it is nevertheless possible that carriers and even warehouse employees will 
fail to ascertain or recognize the limits of the appeal and will either refuse to cross 
the picket lines entirely or will refuse to handle all goods, regardless of whether or 
not the producer is involved in the current dispute. 
Such a restriction was recognized in Auburndale (177 N.L.RB. No. 108, at 6, 71 
L.R.RM. at 1505) and in Sarnoff (307 F. Supp. at 436 nn.1-2, 438-39), and it is con-
sistent with the holding in NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 
58, 72 (1964) [Tree Fruits], that permissible consumer picketing must be "employed 
only to persuade customers not to buy the struck product." 
72. Carrier Corp., 376 U.S. at 499. 
73. For example, in Auburndale the union succeeded in shutting down the entire 
Cypress plant before it began picketing the warehouse. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, at 6, 71 
L.R.R.M. at 1505. 
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the warehouse situation does present substantial risks for the second-
ary employer, such an extension of the doctrine should not be 
allowed to stand. 
In summary, the Auburndale decision appears to be contrary to 
the purposes and policies of the common-situs and related-work 
doctrines, the consistent trend of the case law, and a sensible applica-
tion of Moore Dry Dock.14 It is hoped that in the future the Board 
and the courts will restrict the application of the related-work doc-
trine to picketing on primary premises, and will adhere to the judi-
cially established definition of common situs as a place at which 
both the primary employer and a neutral employer are performing 
separate tasks. By thus abandoning its vague "sufficient presence of 
the primary" test, the Board would provide a more certain standard 
to guide unions in planning their strategy, and yet it would not 
impair either the union's right to carry a strike to all primary em-
ployees or the neutral employer's right to be free of labor disputes 
which do not involve him. 
74. Neither the Board nor the federal district court in Sarnoff addressed itself to the 
question whether an application of §§ 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B) to prohibit the picketing of a 
warehouse under these circumstances would be an unconstitutional infringement of 
the pickets' first-amendment right to free speech. Apparently, the issue was not raised 
in either case because the facts and pleading foreclosed any such constitutional argu-
ments. While Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), established that peaceful 
picketing is an exercise of expression protected by the first amendment, it is equally 
well established that picketing or any other "speech or writing used as an integral 
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal law statute" may constitutionally be 
prohibited. Giboney v. Empire Storage &: Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). The Su-
preme Court has also held that "[t]he prohibition of inducement or encouragement of 
secondary pressure by [§§ 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B)] carries no unconstitutional abridgment of 
free speech." Electrical Workers, Local 50 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951). Since in 
Sarnoff the district court found that the pickets had successfully induced common 
carriers to refuse to cross the warehouse picket line to pick up the primary's product 
(307 F. Supp. at 436), and since in Auburndale the union conceded that its appeal was 
aimed at the warehouse workers who handled the Cypress concentrate (Trial Examiner's 
Decision, supra note 3, at 4), it is clear that in both cases the unions used means 
which are prohibited by §§ 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B), in an attempt to achieve an objective for-
bidden by that section. Although the Supreme Court has never squarely decided the 
issue, it appears to be well established that it is not necessary to show an actual work 
stoppage in order to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4), so long as the unlawful objective 
can otherwise be demonstrated. See, e.g., Lescher Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Local 133, Sheet 
Metal Workers, 310 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Associated Musicians, 
Local 802, 226 F.2d 900, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956). 
There is language in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308, 314 (1968), which would support the broad proposition that "picketing can 
be subjected to a blanket prohibition" if it is "directed at an illegal end." Neverthe-
less, a factual situation could arise in which there is neither interference with the 
secondary's business nor other evidence of an illegal objective on the part of the 
pickets. In such a case the Board or the courts would have to face the question 
whether the picketing of a secondary's warehouse, by itself, justifies an application 
of §§ 8(b)(4)(i)-(ii)(B). 
